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Summary findings
There are diverging views about how minimum wages  roughly 53  percent  of the average unskilled wage.
affect labor markets in developing countries.  Bell charts how the mandated minimum wage affected
Advocates of minimum wages hold that they  the demand for skilled and unskilled labor in both
redistribute resources in a welfare-enhancing way, and  countries during that decade. She finds:
can thus reduce poverty, improve productivity, and  * In Mexico, minimum wages have had virtually nio
foster growth. Opponents,  on the other hand, contend  effect on wages or employment in the formal sector. The
that minimum wage interventions result in a  main reason: the minimum wage is not an effective wage
misallocation of labor and lead to depressed wages in the  for most firms or workers. In the informal sector, in
very sectors - the rural and informal urban sectors - turn, there is considerable noncompliance with the
where most of the poor  are found, with the effect of  mandated minimum wage, especially among part-time
wasting resources and reducing the growth rate.  and female workers. As a result, significant numbers of
Data from Colombia and Mexico for the  1980s  workers are paid at or below minimum wages.
provide an opportunity to evaluate the impact of  * In Colombia, minimum wages have a much stronger
minimum wages. In Mexico in the 1980s, the minimum  impact on wages, judging from their proximity to the
wage fell in real terms roughly 45 percent. By 1990,  average wage and both cross-section and time series
Mexico's minimum wage was about 13 percent of the  estimates. The estimates imply that the elasticity of low-
average unskilled manufacturing wage.  paid unskilled employment with respect to minimum
During the same period, the minimum wage in  wages is in the range of 2 to 12 percent.
Colombia increased at nearly the same rate, reaching
This paper-  a product of the Poverty and Human Resources Division, Policy Research Department - is part of a larger
effort in the department  to analyze the implications of labor market distortions.  The study was funded by the Bank's
Research Support Budget under the research project "The Impact of Labor Market Policies and Institutions on Economic
Performance" (RPO 678-46). Copies of this paper are available free from the World Bank, 1818 H Street NW, Washington,
DC 20433.  Please contact Sheila Fallon, room N8-057,  telephone 202-473-8009,  fax 202-522-1153,  Internet  address
sfallon@worldbank.org  (41 pages). September 1995.
The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to  encourage the exchange of  ideas about
development issues.  An objective of the series  is to get the findings out quickly, even if the presentations are less than fully polished. The
papers carry the names of the authors and should be used atnd  cited accordingly. The findinzgs,  interpretations, and conclusions are the
authors' own and should not be attributed to the Wlorld  Bank, its Executive Board of Directors,  or anv of its member countries.
Produced b) the Policy Research Disscmination CenterThe Impact  of Minimum  Wages  in Mexico  and  Colombia
Linda  A. Bell
Haverford  College
Paper prepared  for Conference  on Labor  Markets  in Developing  Countries,  Washington,  D.C., July 6-8,
1994.
The author gratefully  acknowledges  the research  assistance  of Zachary  Gemnignani  and Sandeep  Poonen,
and helpful  discussion  and comments  from David  Card,  Jonathan  Gruber,  Ann Harrison,  David Neumark,
Ana Revenga,  David Schaeffer,  and Robert  Topel.Divergent  trends in the real  value  of the legally  imposed  minimum  wage in Mexico  and
Colombia  in the 1980s  provide  a unique  backdrop  for evaluating  the impact  of minimum  wages  on
developing  economy  labor  markets. Whereas  the minimum  wage  fell in real terms roughly  45 percent in
the 1  980s in Mexico,  it increased  at nearly  the same rate  in Colombia  over  an overlapping  period of time.
As a result,  by 1990  the minimum  wage stood  at a level  which  was  just 13 percent of the average  unskilled
manufacturing  wage in Mexico  and roughly  53 percent  of the average  unskilled  wage in Colombia.
A review  of the literature  provides  two  clear and divergent  views  on the normative  impact of
minimum  wages  on labor markets  in developing  economies  (Freeman, 1991). The advocate  view holds
that minimum  wages  redistribute  resources  in a welfare  enhancing  way, and as such have  the potential to
reduce  poverty,  enhance  productivity,  and foster  growth. The distortionist  view suggests  that minimum
wage  interventions  misallocate  labor  and lead to depressed  wages  where  most of the poor are found--  in
the informal  urban sector  and in the rural sector--  with  the effect  of wasting resources  and reducing  the
rate of growth.
This paper charts the effect  of the federal  mandated  minimum  wage on labor  market  outcomes  in
Mexico  and Colombia  over the 1980s.  Specifically,  using unique  panel  data on formal sector
manufacturing  firms, the paper estimates  the impact  of minimum  wages  on the demand  for skilled  and
unskilled  labor in both  countries. Important  differences  are found  in the employment  response  of labor  to
minimum  wages  in the two countries. Specifically,  substantial  disemployment  effects  of minimum  wages
are found  only in Colombia,  where  the impact  is greatest  on low skilled  employment. In Mexico, in
contrast,  the disemployment  impact  of minimum  wages  is zero,  at least using the firm level  data for
formal sector  manufacturing  establishments.  The key  explanation  for this fact has to do with  the
relationship  of the legally  imposed  minimum  wage to the distribution  of average  unskilled  wages  across
firms--  the minimum  wage is very  far to the left  in the Mexico  distribution  and much closer  to the mean in
the Colombia  distribution.  Minimum  wages  are ineffective  in the formal  sector in Mexico  and effective  in
Colombia.
Data from individuals  is available  in the case  of Mexico  to supplement  the firm panel data. The
individual  data for Mexico  show  that the minimum  wage has had an important  effect  on the unskilled2
wage distribution in Mexico which is not picked up in average firm wages. The data also reveal
considerable amounts of noncompliance with the federally mandated minimum wage especially among
part-time and women workers, and predominantly in the informal sector.  Reconciling differences in the
two data sources focuses on the role of informal sector labor in the Mexican economy-- and suggests that
estimates from the firm panel data may not capture the broader and more complete impact of minimum
wages in Mexico.
L  Trends  in Minimum Wages
A  Simple Model of Minimum  Wages
The simplest model of the minimum wage and its effect on employment focuses on a single
competitive labor market with homogeneous workers, whose wage in equilibrium is below the legally set
minimum wage.  Incomplete coverage under the minimum wage gives rise to two diverse and segmented
labor markets with two sets of wages and with different distributional and employment impacts of the
minimum wage in both the covered and uncovered sectors.  Application of this model to workers with
heterogeneous skill is relatively straight fonvard  (Welch, 1974; Gramlich,  1976; Mincer,  1976, among
others).
In a developing country context it is more reasonable to think of there being three sectors of the
labor market:  (i) a large urban formal sector where coverage is complete and enforcement  is present;  (ii)
a somewhat smaller urban informal sector in which coverage and enforcement are rare and incomplete,
and;  (iii) an uncovered rural sector.  Although data restrictions often impose studying the impact of
minimum wages in the formal sector of the economy, the impact of minimum wages on informal sector
and rural wages is nontrivial, since it is in these sectors that most of the developing economy poor are
found.
In fact an appeal to theory yields easily identifiable parameters for bracketing the effects of
minimum wages outside of the formal economy.  Assuming perfect mobility between sectors, Hamermesh
(1993) formalizes the relationship between rural and urban wages as follows:3
(1)  Wr = U(Wo)  + (b-u)Wm
where Wm is the legally  enforced  minimum  wage  which  applies  to the urban formal sector, WO  is the
wage in the urban informal  sector,  Wr is the rural wage,  and (1-u) is the fraction  of workers  employed  in
the modem urban sector. Differentiating  Wr with respect  to the minimum  wage  yields (where  Em is
modern  sector  employment):
(2) dWr/dWm = (Wm-WO)  dEm/dWm + (1-u)
and thereby  highlights  the key parameters  of interest. From (2) it is easy  to see that a higher minimum
wage will have  an ambiguous  effect  on rural wages. The minimum  wage will be more likely  to depress
rural wages  (i) the larger is the elasticity  of demand  for labor  in the urban formal sector,  (ii) the greater  is
the gap between  wages  in the formal and informal  sectors,  and (iii)  the smaller is the urban formal sector.
Although  data are not available  from which  to analyze  the impact  of the minimum  wage changes on rural
sector  wages  directly,  the three parameters  at least  provide  a gauge  for speculating  on the broader  impact
of minimum  wage policies  in Mexico  and Colombia.
The  Data
Table 1  summarizes  the behavior  of wages  and the national  weighted  minimum  wage over the
period 1984  to 1990  in Mexico.  1 Panels A and B of the table use  information  on monthly  wages  paid to
workers  from Mexico's  Annual Industrial  Survey  of manufacturing  firms over  the period 1984-1990.2
Panel C supplements  this information  using  data from the Mexican  Ecuesta  Nationale  de Empleo  for
1988,  a household  survey  covering  workers  in both  urban and rural Mexico. 3
'Minimum wages  in Mexico  are set regionally  and may  differ  by occupation. Table 1 presents  weighted
averages  based on these data..
2The Industrial Survey  is of predominantly  large firms in the formal sector. Data were provided  by
Mexico's  Secretary  of Commerce  and Industrial  Development  (SECOFI).
3A11  of the tabulations  and regression  results  from the 1988  Mexican  Household  data were performed  and
provided  by Ana Revenga.4
Several  trends are clear from the table. First, the value of the real minimum  wage has eroded in
Mexico  over  the period 1984  to 1990. With the exception  of 1985,  the trend decline  in the value of the
real minimum  is continuous  over  this period. Second,  the ratio of the minimum  wage to the mean wages
of both blue and white collar workers  has eroded  as well,  although  not as rapidly  as the minimum  given
sizable  reductions  in real wages  for all groups  of workers  over  this period. In 1984, the minimum  wage
represented  22 percent  of the value  of the average  Mexican  wage  and 42 percent  of the value of the
average  Mexican  blue collar wage. By 1990  these  ratios had declined  to 13 percent and 31 percent
respectively. Panel B of the table shows  that consistent  with  the decline  in the real value of the minimum
wage and its relationship  to average  wages  paid in Mexico,  the share of firms paying  average  wages near
the minimum  has declined  as well, and quite dramatically  over  this period. The relationship  between
wages  and the minimum  wage suggested  by the Mexican  household  data in Panel C is different  however,
suggesting  that significantly  greater  numbers  of individuals  as opposed  tofirms have  been affected  by
minimum  wage legislation. This is a potentially  important  difference  to which I will return in the
analysis  that follows.
Table 2 summarizes  minimum  wage  and wage  trends  using Colombia's  Annual Industrial
Survey,  a survey  of large manufacturing  firms that is similar  to the Mexican  Survey,  over a partially
overlapping  period  of time. 4 The data for Colombia  show  the opposite  trend to that of Mexico  over  the
1980s,  with rising real minimum  wages, rising ratios of minimum  to average  wages,  and greater  shares of
firms with wages  in the range of the legislated  minimum  over  the 1980s.  In addition  to differences  in
trend there are sizable  gaps in magnitude  in the two  tables- whereas  27 percent  of firms in Colombia
reported  paying  unskilled  workers  average  wages  that were  below 1.5  times  the Colombian  minimum
wage in 1987,  only 10 percent  of Mexican  firms reported  paying  unskilled  Mexican  workers  average
wages  in this range. Indeed,  at no time was  the impact  of the minimum  wage  on firm wages  in Mexico  as
great as it was in Colombia  over  the common  period  analyzed  here. 5
4Beginning  in 1984  the Survey  was restricted  to firms with greater  than 10 employees.
5Although  the Mexican  Household  Survey  Data give estimates  of affected  workers  that are closer to the
Columbian  figures  at least in 1988,  they include  informal  as well as formal sector workers,  and are not
strictly  comparable  for this reason.5
Information  about firms that pay low  average  unskilled  wages  (and are therefore  minimum  wage
constrained)  and those that pay relatively  high average  wages  (and are therefore  likely  to be unaffected  by
minimum  wage changes)  are presented  for descriptive  purposes  for Colombia  in Table 3.  As a reasonable
bracket on firms likely  to be affected  by minimum  wage  changes,  the table contrasts  the characteristics  of
firms paying wages  below 1.5  times  the minimum  wage  to those paying  wages  above  this cutoff. 6 The
table reveals interesting  differences  between  low  and high wage firms in Colombia. Not surprisingly,  the
low  wage firms are relatively  young  (the mean  of age in 1977  is less  than 2 years),  small (with less  than
half the number  of workers  than unconstrained  firms),  and employ  somewhat  greater  shares  of unskilled
workers. They  are disproportionately  located  in one sector--  textiles  and leather--  with high concentration
as well in food and tobacco,  and machinery  and transportation  equipment. Differences  between  the urban
concentration  of low  and high-paying  Colombian  firms are insignificant.
Wage  histograms  detailing  the distribution  of firm and individual  level wages  from the three data
sets are presented  as a final backdrop  from which  to evaluate  the impact  of minimum  wages  in Figures 1-
5. To the extent  that minimum  wages  are effective,  we should  observe  a notable spike  in the distribution
of wages  at or near the imposed  minimum  wage. If minimum  wages  are not effective,  or are effective  but
poorly  enforced,  then the spike in the distribution  will occur  to the right of the minimum  wage in the first
case,  and will reveal  sizable  shares  of subminimum  firms or workers  in the second  case.
Figure 1  shows  that the minimum  wage has  virtually  no impact  on the distribution  of average
wages  reported  by firms in Mexico,  since  the spike  that does  occur in the distribution  does  so significantly
far to the right of the legally  imposed  minimum  wage- with  the median Mexican  unskilled wage 1.06  In
points  above  the minimum  wage in the 1990  chart. The table  also reveals  very  little evidence  of non-
compliance  with the minimum  wage, since  virtually  no firms  are identified  as paying  wages  below  the
minimum  wage. Figure  2 disaggregates  the data somewhat,  presenting  blue collar wage  distributions  in
low  paying  sectors  and regions  where  the minimum  might be likely  to have  its greatest impact.  Although
only a very  small share of even the lowest  paying  firms  are constrained  by minimum  wage  legislation  in
6This  cutoff  was arbitrarily  chosen. There  are insignificant  differences  in the means  reported  in Table  4
using 1.1,  and 1.3  as alternative  criterion.6
the wages  they  pay workers,  the figures  reveal  the existence  of sizable  industry  and regional effects  in
Mexico,  and suggest  that at least in relative  terms the impact  of minimum  wage legislation  may be
unequal  across  firms.
Wage  distributions  from the Mexican  Household  Survey  in 1988  (Figure  3) contrast noticeably
with  the data from Mexican  firms. Indeed,  according  to these  distributions,  wages  in Mexico  are closer to
the legally  enforced  minimum--  the differences  between  the median  and minimum  wage is .66 In points
for male workers  and .53 In points  for female  workers  in the formal sector,  even  though  these medians
reflect  the wages  of both high and low  skilled workers. For female  workers  in the informal  sector, by
contrast,  there is a virtual spike  at the minimum  wage (with  just .09 In points separating  minimum  and
median wages),  and evidence  of a high degree  of noncompliance. 7 Figure  4 looks in greater  detail at
wages  reported  in the six largest categories  of occupations  in order to get a better  gauge on the distribution
of low  skilled wages  in relationship  to the minimum  wage  and thereby  for comparison  with  the firm level
data. The data in this figure are restricted  moreover  to  formal sector  workers. As is clear from the figure,
and in contrast  to the data on firms,  the minimum  wage lies in close  proximity  to the average wage in the
lowest  skilled distributions.
A stylized  fact of some  importance  and concem  emerges  from the comparisons  of the firm and
household  data in Mexico- namely,  that the estimated  impact  of minimum  wages  on employment  in
Mexico  will depend  on the use of establishment  versus  household  data. All else equal,  the discrepancy
between  the two  surveys  suggests  that estimates  of minimum  wage effects  based on individuals  are likely
to exceed  those based on firms, and suggests  that the more  thorough  examination  consider,  whenever
possible,  both  sets of data.
Figure 5 plots the distribution  of average  skilled  and unskilled  wages  across  firms from the
Colombian  panel data, and shows  a spike  in the distribution  which  is relatively  close  to the legally
7Minimum  wage legislation  in Mexico  applies  to all workers  regardless  of firm size.7
imposed minimum wage (the median-minimum differential is .43 for unskilled workers and .50 for skilled
workers). 8,9
IL Evidence  on Wage Inequality
One consequence of the Heckman and Sedlacek (1981) model, which evaluates the effects of the
minimum wage on workers with heterogeneous skill, is the prediction that wages of all workers able to
retain covered sector employment folloNwing  a real increase in the value of the minimum wage will rise in
equal proportion to the minimum hike.  This view contrasts with the experience of several countries
including the U.S., where evidence suggests that minimum wages have disproportionately small effects on
wages above the minimum (Grossman, 1983). If minimum wages have a larger impact on the wages of
low paid workers, then an increase in the minimum wage (or an expansion in coverage) should compress
wages among high and low paid workers, and therefore decrease measured wage inequality.  Conversely,
a fall in the real value of the minimum wage (or a narrowing of coverage) should result in a rise in wage
inequality.
Abstracting from the effect of minimum on individual wages to consider their effect on firm
average wages seems a reasonable extension of the theory.  Reworked, the idea would be that firms that
pay wages at the minimum would be more affected by real changes in the minimum wage than would
firms paying wages far in excess of the minimum wage. One might logically reason that higher real
minimum wages would cause a narrowing in differences between firms or industries because of this effect.
Indeed, if this were the case, we should expect to see some evidence of rising inequality in the Mexican
firm data and falling inequality in the Colombian firm data.  All else equal,10
8  Of course the precise shares of affected workers will depend on the proximity of the firm's average wage
to the minimum, the relationship between mean and median wages (the distribution), and the level of
inequality in earnings (the standard error of wages within firm).
9 Histograms produced for apprentice and technician workers showed a spike that occurred considerably
far to the left of the rninimum wage line.  Although both distributions spike to the left of the legally
imposed minimum-- and might therefore warn of high levels of noncompliance among certain groups--
the excessively low average wages are most likely due to the relatively high use of part-time and part-year
work among apprentice and technician labor, and idiosyncrasies in the data that do not permit for an
adjustment in light of this fact.9
10Altematively, rising inequality may be the result of poor economic growth and the differential impact of
recession on high and low paying firms.8
the greatest  impact should  be on unskilled  wages,  since  these  averages  will be closer  to minimum  wages.
Consider  first the case  of Mexico. Table  4 lists  for Mexico  various measures  of wage inequality
for unskilled,  skilled,  and aggregate  employment  in manufacturing  firms from 1984 to 1990. As is clear
from the table, wage inequality  has risen somewhat  within  Mexico  over  this period,  both across  industries
and across  firms within industries. Although  high and low paying  firms are not uniformly  distributed
across  Mexican  states, there is little evidence  of changing  dispersion  here.
Table 5 presents inequality  measures  using the Colombian  data. The first thing to note is the
greater  equality  of inter-industry  wages  among  firms in Colombia The data show  moderate  declines  in
inequality  both  within and across  industry,  although  the equalizing  effect  is somewhat  stronger  among
skilled workers. As in Mexico,  the greatest  effect  is within  industry,  with little trend across  regions.  I I
In sum, patterns in wage dispersion  in Mexico  and Colombia  are consistent  with the view that
minimum  wages  have  their greatest  impact  on the earnings  of workers,  and perhaps  firms, whose wages
lie nearest to the minimum  wage. Falling  inequality  in Colombia  over  a period of time that brackets  a
very  severe  recession  is perhaps  the more  interesting  stylized  fact, because  it is not easily  explained  by
business  cycle  conditions.  12
IIL The Impact  of Minimum  Wages  on Employment  and Wages
Time Series Data
Given  the largely  national scope  to minimum  wage fixing in the U.S., time series  studies  have
dominated  the literature  on U.S.  minimum  wages  and their effect  on wages  and employment  (for excellent
summaries  of these studies  see Brown,  Gilroy,  and Kohen, (1982)  and Hamermesh  (1993)). A limited
time-series  of data are available  in Mexico  and Colombia  that permit  somewhat  analogous  tests to those
I lBoth economies  are highly corporatist,  which  might  explain  the dominance  of within industry  effects.
12 If  workers who hold  high paying "good  jobs" are more  protected  than marginal  workers  who hold "bad
jobs" in a downturn  then wage  inequality  should  be counter  cyclical. The work  of Wachter  (1970)  on the
interindustry  wage structure  confirmed  this counter  cyclicality  when applied  to the gap between  union
and nonunion  wage differences.  DiNardo  and Lemieux  (1994)  suggest  that the decline  in union
institutions,  not supply  and demand  factors,  is responsible  for the rise in inequality  in the U.S. in the
1980s.9
conducted  in the United  States.  Specifically,  I estimate  the following  relationships  in both countries  over
time:
(3)  In (wage)t =  Ol + a21n (min)t + a3 In (GNP)t + c± 41n (price)t +  a5 trend  + E
(4) In (emp/pop)t  = 1 In (min/avewage)t  +  3 21n (GNP)  +  3 31n (price)t  + I4trend + s
where  min is the legally  imposed  minimum  wage,  min/avewage  is the minimum  wage deflated  by an
average  (manufacturing)  wage which  may be weighted  by coverage  and is equal to the weighted  national
average  wage in Mexico  and the large  cities minimum  wage  in Colombia, 13 and real GNP (or  the
unemployment  rate) is used to control  for business  cycle  conditions  and its affect  on both wages  and
employment.
Table 6 presents  the estimates  from equations  (3) and (4) using  annual manufacturing  data for
Mexico  and Colombia.  The aggregate  data show significant  minimum  wage  effects  in Colombia  but not in
Mexico  over overlapping  periods  of data. The implied  elasticities  suggest  that the increase  in the relative
value of the minimum  wage in Colombia  from 1977  to 1987  (roughly  15  percent)  had the effect  of
reducing  manufacturing  employment  by 5 percent  over  this period. This effect  is similar  in magnitude  to
that found in Puerto  Rico (Castillo-Freeman  and Freeman  (1992))  and in the U.S.  for young  workers
(Hamermesh  (1993)).
Panel Data from  Firms
The difficulties  associated  with evaluating  the effects  of minimum  wages  from a cross-section  of
firms are well known (Hamermesh  (1993),  Brown,  Gilroy,  Kohen (1982); Freeman  (1979)). The biggest
problem  comes from the fact  that most of the variation  in the minimum  wage  variable--  typically
13Data  limitations  prevent  weighting  by coverage  in either case,  although  this omission presents larger
problems  in the case of Columbia. Specifically,  the fixed  provision  that subjects  Columbian  firms with
assets  greater  than pesos $200,000  to minimum  wage  laws has had the effect  of extending minimum  wage
coverage,  since  inflation  and devaluation  have  eroded  the real value  of this nominal  target over  time.
The fact that smaller firms have  increasingly  become  subject  to minimum  wage laws in Columbia
suggests  that the above  equations  may underpredict  the true negative  impact  of minimum  wages  on
employment/population  rados in Columbia  over  this period.10
measured as the ratio of minimum to average firm wages-- comes from the variation in wage levels across
firms, and not from variation in the minimum wage.  Disentangling "minimum wage effects" from  "firm
wage effects" is difficult in this case.  The existence of regional minimum wages in Mexico,14 and the
dual structure of minimum wage payments in Colombia 15 (with differentiation for large cities versus
other areas) makes these countries appealing to study since there is greater measured variation in
minimum wages.  Panel data from manufacturing firms provide variation over time and a changing trend
in the real value of the minimum wage in each country adds a further element of heterogeneity to the
minimum wage variable.
In order to isolate the impact of the minimum wage on the employment of unskilled and skilled
labor, I consider the firm conceptually as employing three types of labor, namely skilled, high paid
unskilled, and low paid unskilled labor.  Corresponding to each type.  of labor is a factor price-- the skilled
wage, the unskilled wage, and the minimum wage, respectively. Following Hamermesh (1982) an
appropriate specification of the effect of a minimum wage change on low paid unskilled labor must hold
fixed for the effect of such a change on the higher paid tail of the unskilled distribution and on the wages
of the more skilled.  Assuming that the supply of each type of labor to the firm is perfectly elastic, 16 firm
employment (for either unskilled or skilled labor) is given as a function of the price of all inputs
(including the minimum wage), and output prices (which is available at the 4-digit ISIC level and is
comfortably thought of as an instrument for firm  output).  Specifically, we have:
(5) Employment = f [min, PI, Pk, Pm' Pe]
14Fourteen  regional minimum wages were in place in Mexico in 1984, although this number has
diminished through time as the Mexican govemment has gradually tried to equalize differences across
regions.  For example, by 1990 only five regional minimum were differentiated and enforced in Mexico.
15In Columbia the dual-minimum wage structure which differentiated  between large cities and smaller
cities and agricultural areas was replaced with a single minimum wage in 1985.
1 6Even with plant level data for the most unskilled workers this assumption is troublesome, although the
existence of  large urban informal sectors in most developing economies offers hope that it may be a better
approximation  to reality in a developing country context.  Certainly for the unskilled and  minimum wage
labor (whose wages are set by fiat) the assumption seems most reasonable.11
wheTe  min is the legally  mandated  minimum  wage which  is lagged  one  year in most specifications,  17 Pi
represents  the price paid to wage labor  of varying  types,  pk is a measure  of the cost of capital (available  in
the Mexico  data only), Pm is a raw materials  price,  Pe is an energy  price (available  in the Colombia  data
only),  and ppi is an output  price deflator  for the ISIC  at the 4-digit level.  18 Generalizing  equation  (3)
allows  estimation  of the following  system  of equations  for skilled  and unskilled  labor:
(6') Eus = aI  + cL 2 min/ppi + a3Pus/ppi  + a 4Ps/ppi + aL 5Pk/ppi + cX6Pm/PPi  + a7Pe/PPi + El
(6") Es =  Y1 + Y2  min/ppi + Y3Pus/PPi  + y4Ps/ppi + Y5Pk/PPi  + Y6Pm/PPi  + Y 7Pe/PPi +2
All variables  estimated  in logarithms. Less restrictive  versions  of the model  that ignore  the implicit
homogeneity  assumption  implied  by the output  price deflation  are presented  as well in the results  that
follow.
Table 7 presents  estimates  of equations  (6') and (6") for Mexico. Ordinary-least  squares
estimates  in columns (1) and (7) of the table for unskilled  and skilled  workers respectively  yield large
estimated  gross  elasticities  of employment  with  respect  to the minimum  wage,  but wrong-signed  own-
factor  price elasticities  for both  skilled and unskilled  employment.  The estimates  of cross-price  elasticities
from the unskilled regression  are correctly  signed,  although  the skilled  estimates  fail to provide  evidence
in favor  of capital-skill  complementarity.  Industry,  occupation,  region,  and year effects  are highly
significant  in both OLS  equations.
Columns  (2)-(6)  and (8)-(1  1) of the table present  various estimates  of the model  controlling  for
within-firm  variation in the response  of employment  to changes  in factor  prices. The fixed  effects
estimates  abstract  from differences  in scale,  technology,  and various  other  factors  that are likely to
influence  the speed  and magnitude  of factor  share response  in so large a cross-section  of firms. The fixed-
effects  estimates  for the basic model  are presented  in columns  (2)-(4)  of the table for unskilled  workers,
17In both  Mexico  and Columbia,  minimum  wages  are frequently  revised  throughout  the year, and annual
minimum  wages  may represent  an average  of multiple  year revisions. In addition,  even where minimum
wages  are not revised  throughout  the year, they  may typically  be announced  (as was the case in Columbia)
in mid-year.
18Factor  price data are derived  using quantity  and value  data on the purchase  of the relevant  factor.12
and in columns  (8) and (9) of the table for skilled  workers. Own factor-price  elasticities  are the correct
sign and reasonable  magnitudes,  although  given a ratio of unskilled  to skilled  labor that averages  near twvo
in the Mexican  data, they are not symmetric  in estimated  cross-price  effects. The estimates  show  that
minimum  wages  have no impact on the employment  of either unskilled  or skilled  Mexican  workers within
firms--the  coefficients  are small,  often  wrong-signed,  and statistically  insignificant  from zero in all cases.
This is true in the case  of both  contemporaneous  and lagged  minimum  wages.  19 Columns  (5)-(6) and
(10)-(1  1) of the table relax the homogeneity  condition  imposed  by looking  at factor  price ratios and focus
instead on In levels  of factor  prices. Sectoral  output  prices (at a 4-digit  ISIC level)  and the predicted  value
of sectoral  output (at a 2-digit  ISIC level) 20 are added  alternatively  as instruments  for firn-level output.
There is no notable impact  of any of these  changes  on the estimates  summarized  above.
Table  8 estimates  a similar  set of employment  equations  for Colombian  firms from 1981-1987.
Earlier years were initially excluded  from the panel because  they did not provide  information  about factor
prices other than labor. Data  on the cost of capital were  not available  in the Colombian  data although
energy  prices were.
Ordinary  least squares  estimates  of the restricted  model  are presented  in columns (1) and  Ž).
Similar to Mexico,  the OLS  estimates  produce  wrong  signed  and significant  own-factor  price elasticities
that contradict  conventional  wisdom. 21 The fixed  effects  equations  produce  more  sensible estimates  of the
relevant parameters. Own-price  elasticities  are correctly  signed  and of reasonable  magnitude,  and given a
ratio of unskilled  to skilled labor  of roughly  2.5, they  are roughly  symmetric  in estimated  cross  price
effects. Consistent  with theory,  the results  yield a significantly  higher  estimated  own-price  elasticity  for
unskilled labor. Energy  and raw materials  prices are estimated  p-substitutes  for high skilled labor;
energy  is an estimated  p-substitute  for low  skilled  labor  as well and the relationship  between  raw materials
prices and unskilled  labor is less stable.
1 9Minimum  wage data in Mexico  are revised  quarterly,  and annual minimum  wage  are derived  as
averages  of these  quarterly  figures. For this reason,  the lagged  minimum  wage has greater  economic
content in an employment  equation.
20Predicted  values of sectoral  output  at the two  digit level  are obtained from an auxiliary  regression  on
sectoral  output  on output  prices and industry  dummy  variables.
2 1This may  be explained  by, among other  things,  the existence  of very  sizable  firm-size  wage effects  in
both countries  over  this period.13
The estimates  in Table  8 strongly  confirm  the proposition  that the minimum  wage substantially
affected  employment  in manufacturing  firms in Colombia.  The sizable  minimum  wage effects  are robust
across alternative  specifications  and using both lagged  and contemporaneous  minimum  wage information.
The elasticity  of employment  with respect  to the minimum  wage  is in the range of .15 to .33 in the case of
unskilled workers,  and .03 to .24 in the case  of skilled  workers 22, depending  on lag structure  and the
exact specification  of the other parameters. The firm panel  data is therefore  crudely  consistent  with the
magnitude  of effects  implied  by the time series  estimates.
The estimated  elasticities  are presumably  a lower  bound  on the true effect  of minimum  wages  on
low  wage labor. If we take as a guide the fact  that 27 percent  of Colombian  firms report wages  within a
range of 1.5  times the minimum  wage,  and as a crude approximation  assume  that roughly  the same
percentage  of individuals  are so affected,  then  the implied  mninimum  wage elasticities  for minimum  wage
labor may  be as high as .55 to 1.22,  depending  on specification.  23 In any case,  without  more  precise
information,  it is probably  best to think of the two  sets  of estimates  as bracketing  the true effect of the
minimum  wage  on low  wage,  low  skilled Colombian  labor. Together,  they suggest  that the roughly 10
percent rise in the real value  of the minimum  wage  from 1981-1987  (Table  2) reduced  low skilled low
wage Colombian  employment  in the range of 2 to 12 percent  over  the period.
Alternative  Specifications with the Colombia Data
Several  relevant issues  of design  may weaken  the Colombia  firm level employment  regression
results. First, although  a dual structure  to mninimum  wage  fixing with  differential  rates for large and
small cities persists  in Colombia  through the 1984  period,  by 1985  the country  had established  a single
national minimum  wage standard. This  eliminates  the valued  heterogeneity  in the minimum  wage over
the later period and makes  interpretation  of the minimum  coefficient  difficult  at least over  this range. If
22The differences  between  the average  wages  of skilled and unskilled  wages  are relatively  small in
Columbia  (a .07 In point differential)  which might  explain  the impact  of minimum  wages  on the
employment  of this group.
23This  assumes  implicitly  that the distribution  of wages  is roughly  normally  distributed  within  firms (as it
is across  firms)  and affected  firms are no bigger  than average  size,  as a lower  estimate  on the effect. In
fact from Table  3 it is clear that affected  firms tend to be the smaller  firms, implying  if anything  a greater
multiple  effect.14
minimum wages have the estimated effects on employment as described in the Table 8 regressions, then it
would follow that a rise in the relative value of the large cities minimum wage should, all else  equal,
decrease large cities employment relative to small cities employment over time.  Because a majority of
firms in our sample are in large cities and because these firms tend to be larger and more stable, I focus on
employment trends in this group relative to the minimum wage.  Smaller firms located in small cities are
less stable and the employment numbers show less of a interpretable trend over time.
Figure 6 plots the ratio of the large cities minimum to average wage, and the relative employment
share of large cities to small cities for both unskilled (top panel) and skilled (bottom panel) employment
over time.  As is clear from the figure, there is an inverse relationship between the two series over time,
which is especially strong for unskilled employment-- the group at or near the minimum wage and most
likely to be affected by value changes.  Although suggestive at best, the minimum wage plot is supportive
of the interpretation given to the Table 8 regression results.
Second, although the theoretical model directs that all input prices other than wages be used in
the employment equations, limiting ourselves to this restriction forces estimation over the 1981-87
subperiod since input price data are not available prior to that date for Colombia, and therefore does not
capture the period of most rapid rise in the real value of the minimum wage. Table 8.A tests the
robustness of the employment demand equations by moving away from the reduced form equations  of (6')
and (6") in a variety of ways.  In columns (l)-(4),  I estimate the responsiveness of unskilled employment
to mninimum  wages (columns 1-2) and lagged minimum wages (columns 3-4) over the period 1977 to
1987, omitting by necessity both materials and energy input prices.  In both  column (1)-- the restrictive
specification-- and column (2)-- the unrestricted specification-- the effect of the minimum wage on
employment is insignificantly different from zero. Lagged minimum wage effects are generally stronger
and in the case where input price levels are used, the estimated minimum wage elasticity is of similar
magnitude to the earlier estimates.  These results, especially for contemporaneous minimum wage effects,
conflict with and therefore challenge the earlier estimates, although the 1981-87 calculations reproduced
from Table 8 and estimated in columns (5) and (6) without input prices also produce insignificant  and
muted coefficient estimates on the contemporaneous minimum wage variable.  Presumably, input prices15
are an omitted variable of importance to both the full period (1977-87) and  sub-period (1981-87)
contemporaneous regressions.24
A third concern with the earlier interpretation is the parameterizing of the effects of minimum
wage fixing on unskilled employment in Mexico.  In arriving at an implied elasticity of unskilled
employment with respect to the minimum wage in the range of -.55 to greater than  -1.0,  I have
generalized about the distribution of affected individuals based on information about the distribution of
firms that pay wages at or near the minimum.  It may be equally reasonable to think of all unskilled
workers as potential minimum wage workers and base calculations of impact on estimates that exclude the
unskilled wage.  Columns (5) and (6) of  Table 8A re-estimate the basic employment equations from Table
8 omitting the unskilled wage.  The coefficient estimates suggest implied minimum wage elasticities as
high as .45, but much smaller than the distribution adjusted interpretation given to the coefficient
estimates in the previous section.
As a final issue, columns (7) and (8) of the table balance the panel data by dropping firms
missing data over the  1981 to 1987 period.  Presumably this has the effect of isolating only the largest and
most stable firms, and has the advantage of comparability with the Mexico data, which has been balanced
by design.  Given the existence of sizable firm-size wage effects in the Colombia data,25 the balancing
should reduce the estimated minimum wage elasticity.  As is clear from the table, balancing the panel in
this way reduces the number of observations by over 50 percent, and produces unstable coefficient
estimates of the minimum wage impact on low wage employment.
The most serious threat to the estimated minimum wage elasticities from the original Table 8
regressions arises due to the fact that over the 1977-87 period -- the entire sample period covered by the
Colombia data -- the contemporaneous effects of minimum wages on employment are statistically
insignificant.  However, the fact that input prices matter is not surprising given the Table 8 results and the
likelihood of some correlation between input prices and the minimum wage, and in any case, the omission
24Lagged minimum wage effects remain significant in the 1981-87 specifications omitting other input
prices.  Energy prices and materials prices are p-substitutes to unskilled labor and presumably are
correlated positively with the contemporaneous minimum wage.
25There is as much as a 60% firm-size differential between the top 1/5 sized firms and the bottom  1/5
sized firms in the Colombia data.16
of input prices from the later period estimates in Table 8 has a similar dampening effect.  In any case, a
simple plot of relative minimum wage trends to relative employment trends  is strongly suggestive of a
negative relationship between unskilled employment and minimum wages over time.  In sum, the
empirical results indicate that minimum wage fixing has had a negative and significant impact on
unskilled employment in Colombia, at least over the 1980s following and coinciding with a period when
minimum wages were rising in relative importance.
IV.  Minimum  Wages  and Labor  Market  Segmentation
Coverage under minimum wage laws was granted to all Mexican workers as part of the 1974
revised labor code irrespective of the size of the enterprise in which they work (Roberts, 1991).  In theory,
this should cover the 50.5 percent of urban wage earners who were employed in the informal sector in
1988.  The wage histograms in figures 3 and 4 suggest otherwise, since they reveal large shares of
individuals whose wages fall below the minimum wage.  Because the urban informal sector is quite large
in Mexico it is an important outlet for displaced formal sector workers and a major employer in Mexico.
Understanding the characteristics of the employed in this sector is important for this reason.  Using the
household data to examine differences between formal and informal sector work and workers may help to
verify the establishment level results.
Table 9 examines in detail the issue of noncompliance using 1988 Mexican Household Survey
data.  The incidence of non-compliance with the minimum wage-  defined here as the proportion  of
individuals reporting wages below the federally mandated minimum wage-- varies considerably according
to whether the individual reports that he or she works in a formal sector private job (receives social
security and works in a registered private firm) or not.  As expected, non-compliance is far more prevalent
in the informal sector than in the formal sector in all cases and for all categories of workers.
Despite large formal/informal sector differences, what may be most striking about the results in
Table 9 is the degree of compliance that actually exists in the informal sector.  Indeed, greater than  80
percent of full-time male informal sector workers earn wages in excess of the minimum wage, and nearly
60 percent of full-time female workers are so compensated. The numbers may reflect efforts to comply17
with minimum wage laws in the informal sector; alternatively, they may be an unrelated consequence of
the steady slide in the real value of the minimum wage in Mexico since the late 1970s.
Several other facts emerge from the Table 9 means. First, male full-time workers are unlikely to
earn below minimum wages regardless of whether they work in the formal or informal sectors of the
Mexican economy, and regardless of their occupation, region of work, or educational status.  These data
are therefore consistent with the firm level data in showing a weak impact of the minimum wage on male
workers, since roughly 80 percent of the unskilled employed in the firm level data are male. Second, part-
time workers are far more likely to be paid sub-minimum wages than are full-time workers.  This is true
for both the formal and informal sectors and is especially pronounced for female workers. Third, women
are more likely to earn sub-minimum wages than are their male counterparts with comparable education,
labor market status, and occupation.  Fourth, sub-minimum wage workers are more likely to be found in
lower paid occupations (laborers, salespersons, and service workers), although these differences seem to
be more pronounced in the formal sector.  In the urban informal sector sub-minimum wage earners are
more evenly spread across-diverse occupations, and especially so for female and part-time workers.  Fifth,
non-compliance is higher in the (relatively poor) South than in the Federal District (which surrounds
Mexico City) and the (relatively rich) North.
To what extent are the differences between the formal and informal sectors noted above the result
of labor market segmentation?  To what extent do they arise from differences in the characteristics  of
informal workers and informal jobs?  In order to better understand the origins of formal and informal
sector pay differences,  I used the  1988 data and evaluated mean earnings differences after controlling for
competitive factors commonly associated with these differences.  Specifically, OLS equations were
estimated linking In hourly income to a set of variables capturing characteristics of the individual
(education and experience), and of the job (occupation, industry and region).  A dummy variable was
included for whether or not the individual was a formal sector worker.  Two definitions of formal sector18
status were used in alternative specifications with qualitative similar outcomes in each case.26-- the more
restrictive definition is used in the analysis that follows.
Given substantial differences in the patterns of formal and informal work according to gender
and labor market status and in order to better characterize these differences, table 10 presents earnings
equations for male and female full- and part-time workers considered separately.  Column  1 shows an  11
percent advantage to formal sector work for male workers-- which is majority explained by differences in
relative endowments of human capital (column 2). The column 3 results suggest that after controlling for
occupation, industry, and region, formal sector workers earn roughly 4 percent more than comparable
informal sector workers.  Columns 4-6 show similar although much larger returns to formal sector work
for part-time male workers.
Columns 7-12 complete the analysis for female full-time (columns 7-9) and part-time (columns
10-12) workers and demonstrate the much larger benefits of formal sector status for Mexican women.
Specifically, women with formal sector work receive on average wages that are 52 percent higher than
women with informal sector work-- an advantage more than twice that of males.  Although most of this
difference is explained by differences in the characteristics of formal and informal sector jobs, female
workers in formal sector jobs receive 15 percent higher hourly pay than otherwise comparable workers in
the informal sector.
One potential problem in interpreting the estimates above is the greater heterogeneity in the
earnings and personal characteristics of informal sector workers.  An important source of this
heterogeneity originates in the self-employed workers (all of whom are by design in the informal  sector),
whose personal attributes and earnings as a group are highly unequal.  For example, the standard  error of
In hourly earnings for the self-employed is two-times as great as for all other workers, and 60 percent
larger than the variation in non-self employed informal worker pay.  As a group the self-employed have
much greater variation in schooling levels and age, especially for female workers.27
26The less restrictive definition included all private sector workers receiving social insurance
contributions; the more restrictive definition imposed as well the condition that workers report
employment in private registered firms.
27The standard error of the In of earnings is .006 for male formal sector workers, .008 for male informal
sector workers who are not self-employed, and .011 for male self-employed.  Presented in the same order,19
In any case, excluding  the self-employed  focuses  more  narrowly  on differences  among  the wage
earning population  that constitutes  the group  affected  by minimum  wages,  and yields an analysis more
comparable  to the analysis conducted  for firms.  In this vein,  table 11  presents  estimates  of formal sector
wage effects  excluding  the self-employed. It shows  that  formal sector  differences  are much larger,
especially  for male full-time  workers, and more  similar  wvith  respect  to gender  and labor  market status.
As a guide, the estimates  suggest  that formal sector  workers  earn an 18  to 27 percent premium  for work in
the formal sector (with greater  returns  for females).
While the household  data provide  no value based  information  on total compensation,  they do
provide  discrete  information  about  the nonwage  benefits  workers  receive  at their  job.  Specifically,
individuals  are asked whether  they receive  profit sharing payments,  Christmas  or other bonus,  vacation
leave,  medical  assistance,  or housing  credits  in their current  job. This information  can be incorporated
into the analysis in order to better understand  whether  the wage premiums  estimated  above  are upper or
lower  bounds  on the true compensation  effects. Specifically,  the data allow one to estimate  the
conditional  probability  of receiving  each type  of benefit  (or a package  of these benefits)  controlling  for
characteristics  of the individual  (education  and experience),  and  job (occupation,  industry,  and region  of
the country)  and conditional  on formal  sector  status.  Probit  estimates  for each of the non-wage  benefit
items  and packages  of benefits  (not  presented  here)  all produced  positive  signed  coefficients  on the formal
sector  variable  that were significant  at greater  than 99 percent confidence  levels  in all cases, suggesting
that if anything, the large measured  wage  advantages  estimated  here may  underestimate  the true
compensation  advantage  to formal  versus informal  sector  work  in Mexico. 28
If the sizable  differences  between  formal  and informal  sector  pay can be taken as long run effects,
then the data provide  evidence  of a Mexican  labor  market  that is segmented  between  high paying  formal
and informal  sector  jobs, since  wages, non-wage  benefits,  and compliance  with minimum  wage laws are
all lower in the informal  sector. As modeled  in Section  1, the larger  is the (skill-adjusted)  gap between
the respective  standard  errors for schooling  are .051, .044,  and .066; for age they are .131, .151, and .187.
For female workers  the differences  are much larger-- .007, .014,  and .022 for In income; .057, .062, and
.101 for schooling;  and .131, .219, and .292  for age.
28The only  exception  to this pattern were  the individual  probit  estimates  for medical  benefits,  which
yielded negatively  and statistically  significant  coefficients  on the formnal  sector  dummy  variable.20
formal and informal  sector  pay (the greater  is market  segmentation),  the more likely  is it that effective
minimum  wage laws will result in a fall in rural sector  wages. The fact  that the urban informal  sector has
grown in Mexico  (from 49.4 percent of urban employment  in 1984  (Roberts,  1991)  to 50.5 percent in
1988  (calculations  here) reinforces  the possibility  of such  an effect  on rural wages.
In sum, detailed  examination  of the household  sector  data reveal  interesting  differences  in pay
between  formal and informal  sector  workers,  with  the largest  differences  concentrated  among part-time
and female  workers. The fact  that very  few male  formal sector  workers  report wages  at or near the
minimum  wage provide  only  weak  validation  for the firm level  averages  (in which more  than two thirds of
the unskilled  workers  are male),  because  they  are based  on both skilled  and unskilled individual  wages.  In
any case,  the largest differences  in the measured  effects  of minimum  wages  in the two data sets  arise from
the inclusions  of lower  paid informal  workers  in the household  data.
V.  Conclusions
This paper has used diverse  data to examine  the impact  of minimum  wage legislation  on wages
and employment  in Mexico  and Colombia. Divergent  trends in the behavior  of the real minimum  wage in
the two countries  in the 1980s  provides  an interesting  backdrop  from which to study  the effects  of
minimum  wages. Indeed,  the effects  of minimum  wages  on the two economies  in the 1980s  reflect in
some measure  these divergent  trends.
In the case  of Mexico,  minimum  wages  have had virtually  no effect  on wages  or employment  in
the formal sector. The key explanation  for this lies in the position  of the minimum  wage relative  to the
wages  of formal sector  workers--  the minimum  wage  is not an effective  wage in either set of data for a
majority  of firms or workers. Concerning  employment,  the time series  and more  reliable  panel data
estimates  both  yield elasticities  of low  skilled  employment  with respect  to the minimum  wage which are
statistically  insignificant  and near zero  over  this period.
Where the minimum  wage is more  likely  to have  had a notable  effect  is in the Mexican  informal
sector,  where  data suggest  that significant  numbers  of workers  are paid at or below  minimum  wages.
Understanding  better the impact  of minimum  wage laws  over  time on estimated  formal and informal21
sector differentials, as well as their effect on  informal wages, would be a useful supplement to the analysis
presented  here.
By contrast in Colombia, where minimum wages have a much stronger impact on wvages  judging
by their proximity to the average wage and the time series estimates, the effects of the minimum wage are
far more pronounced.  The estimates from firm-level panel strongly confirm the proposition that
minimum wages have affected employment in Colombia. Given reasonable assumptions about the
distribution of minimum wage labor across firms, the estimates imply a disemployment impact of
minimum wages on low paid unskilled labor in the range of  2 to 12 percent over the period 1981-1987 in
Colombia.  The estimates that exclude the unskilled wage and therefore posit an effect of minimum  wages
on all unskilled workers imply a disemployment impact of minimum wages on low paid unskilled labor
that falls in the lower half of this range.22
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TABLE 1
The Minimum  Wage in Mexicol, 1984-1990
A. Minimum  Wage Trends
Year  Minimum wages  Real minimum  Real wages  Min  wage/  mean  Min wage/ mean
wages 2 (1984=100)  (1984=100)3  (white collar wage)  (blue collar wage)
1984  660  100.00  100.00  0.22  0.42
1985  1037  101.40  106.16  0.20  0.39
1986  1770  91.87  95.91  0.21  0.41
1987  3855  84.91  91.54  0.20  0.40
1988  7218  76.34  89.53  0.18  0.38
1989  8070  73.77  100.65  0.15  0.34
1990  9346  69.19  106.57  0.13  0.31
1991  10958  68.92  x  x  x
1992  12084  68.12  x  x  x
B. Share of Firms Affected, 1984-1989
(percentage  of firms with  average  wages  as indicated)
Blue Collar Wages, National  Blue Collar Wages, 3 Lowest Paying Industries4
Year  Below  Below  Below  Below  Below  Below
minimum  1.5*minimum  2.0*minimum  minimum  1.5*minimum  2.0*minimum
1984  1.91  14.35  39.02  2.97  21.19  54.65
1985  1.87  12.61  36.60  2.23  18.03  49.26
1986  0.89  10.06  35.03  0.92  15.98  52.23
1987  0.76  9.55  33.63  1.49  15.61  47.58
1988  0.59  8.75  32.74  1.30  13.94  46.65
1989  1.10  6.37  23.52  1.86  10.41  33.08
C. Share  of Workers  Affected,  1988 Household  Survey Data
(percentage of full-time, male workers with average wages as indicated)
Formal Sector  Informal Sector
Year  Below  Below  Below  Below  Below  Below
minimum  1.5*minimum  2.0*minimum  minimum  1.5*minimum  2.0*minimum
1988  2.16  24.18  48.02  16.48  44.74  62.94
'Daily  minimum wages in pesos.
2 Minimum wages deflated using producer price index in each year, based on 1984=100.
3 Annual wages deflated using producer price index in each year, based on 1984=100.
4 ISIC 31, 33, 39.25
TABLE 2
The Minimum Wage in Colombial, 1977-1987
A. Minimum Wage Trends
YEAR  Minimum  Real minimum  Real wages 3 Minimum wage  /  Minimum wage /  Minimum wage /
wages  wages 2 (1977=100)  mean (skilled  mean (unskilled  mean (apprentice
(1977=100)  wage)  wage)  wage)
1977  62.92  100.000  100.000  0.317  0.464  0.789
1978  83.33  113.753  126.097  0.277  0.421  0.703
1979  115.00  124.888  121.819  0.343  0.479  0.764
1980  150.00  129.996  120.897  0.371  0.503  0.808
1981  190.00  131.597  120.141  0.373  0.513  0.771
1982  247.00  140.194  126.580  0.389  0.519  0.773
1983  308.70  148.826  134.652  0.382  0.518  0.753
1984  376.60  148.593  136.758  0.380  0.513  0.744
1985  451.92  141.467  132.619  0.385  0.507  0.714
1986  560.38  142.261  129.456  0.400  0.527  0.724
1987  683.66  136.548  126.638  0.395  0.523  0.731
B. Share of Firms Affected
(percentage  of firms with  average  wages  as indicated)
Unskilled  Wages  Apprentice Wages
Year  Below  Below  Below  Below  Below  Below
minimum  1.5*minimum  2.0*minimum  minimum  1.5*minimum  2.0*minimum
1977  4.40  24.45  58.31  41.84  70.56  88.26
1978  3.26  15.17  47.71  35.92  62.61  82.42
1979  4.74  24.31  59.85  38.11  67.78  86.23
1980  4.28  27.13  64.38  41.20  72.10  89.19
1981  4.68  30.11  64.80  39.21  70.46  88.29
1982  4.57  31.38  67.61  36.21  70.97  87.95
1983  4.70  30.07  66.93  35.20  70.17  87.31
1984  3.11  27.38  68.59  34.62  68.40  86.55
1985  2.72  26.56  68.39  33.87  65.60  85.12
1986  3.74  29.08  71.52  32.05  64.67  84.16
1987  2.97  27.08  71.37  36.68  65.57  84.99
1Daily minimum  wages  for large cities in pesos.
2Minimum wages deflated using producer price index in each year, based on 1977=100.
3Annual wages deflated using producer price index in each year, based on 1977=100.26
TABLE 3
Mean Characteristics of Minimum Wage Firns  in Colombia, 1987
(standard errors in parentheses)
Minimum Wage  Unconstrained Firms
Constrained Firms'
Total employment  105.901  233.080
(7.574)  (7.177)
Share of unskilled  0.271  0.240
(0.002)  (0.001)
Food, Beverages, Tobacco (isic=3 1)  0.164  0.202
(0.009)  (0.006)
Textiles and Leather (isic=32)  0.406  0.221
(0.011)  (0.006)
Wood Products (isic=33)  0.059  0.054
(0.005)  (0.003)
Paper and Printing  (isic=34)  0.041  0.081
(0.005)  (0.004)
Chem., Rubber, Plastics (isic=35)  0.090  0.135
(0.007)  (0.005)
Clay, Stone, Glass (isic=36)  0.050  0.059
(0.005)  (0.003)
Iron and Steel (isic=37)  0.009  0.017
(0.002)  (0.002)
Mach. and Transp. Equip.  (isic=38)  0.161  0.210
(0.009)  (0.006)
Misc. Manufacturing  (isic=39)  0.021  0.022
(0.003)  (0.002)
Start Year  75.140  70.545
(0.257)  (0.182)
Location in Big Cities  0.841  0.846
(0.009)  (0.005)
Location in Smaller Cities and More  0.159  0.154
Rural Areas  (0.009)  (0.005)
1853  5115
Number of Firms
'Firms  paying average unskilled wages at or below 1.5 times the minimum wage;  all other firms are
classified as unconstrained firms.27
TABLE 4
Wage  Variation  in Mexico  1984-19901
(Standard  deviation  of In wage  as indicated)
A. Inter-Industry Variation in Wages 2
Year  All Worker  Wages  Blue Collar Worker  White Collar Worker
Wages  Wages
1984  0.1753  0.1419  0.1596
1985  0.1817  0.1518  0.1673
1986  0.1838  0.1447  0.1695
1987  0.1861  0.1425  0.1692
1988  0.2079  0.1595  0.1913
1989  0.2135  0.1622  0.1926
1990  0.2129  0.1588  0.1742
B. Intra-Industry Variation in Wages (All Workers) by 2-digit ISIC Codes 3
Year  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39
1984  0.3322  0.3637  0.2510  0.3729  0.3900  0.4336  0.3183  0.3261  0.3718
1985  0.3573  0.4413  0.3600  0.4345  0.4347  0.4346  0.4055  0.4051  0.3156
1986  0.3211  0.4148  0.2106  0.3313  0.3822  0.4130  0.2826  0.3165  0.2475
1987  0.3235  0.3792  0.2236  0.3627  0.3619  0.4345  0.3125  0.3312  0.2888
1988  0.3438  0.3960  0.2475  0.3498  0.4059  0.4458  0.3393  0.3395  0.3334
1989  0.3850  0.3922  0.3837  0.3801  0.4387  0.4811  0.3580  0.3984  0.3484
1990  0.4025  0.4253  0.3759  0.3677  0.4622  0.5130  0.3485  0.4334  0.3190
C. Regional (State) Variation in Wages 4
Year  All Workers Wages  Blue Collar Workers  White Collar Workers
Wages  Wages
1984  0.1260  0.1032  0.1345
1985  0.1271  0.1010  0.1379
1986  0.1246  0.1023  0.1337
1987  0.1252  0.0988  0.1372
1988  0.1317  0.1057  0.1401
1989  0.1392  0.1097  0.1425
1990  0.1310  0.1019  0.1385
'Establishment Survey  Data.
2 Standard  deviation  of monthly  wage across  3-digit ISIC  industry.
3 Standard  deviation  of monthly  wage across  2-digit ISIC  industry.
4 Standard  deviation  of annual wage within  detailed  state code.28
TABLE 5
Wage Variation in Colombia, 1977-19871
(Standard deviation in In wage as indicated)
A.  Inter-Industry  Variation in Wages2
Year  Average Wage  Skilled Wage  Unskilled Wage  Apprentice  Wage
1977  0.165  0.152  0.141  0.138
1978  0.156  0.136  0.145  0.144
1979  0.150  0.131  0.135  0.147
1980  0.135  0.113  0.121  0.167
1981  0.144  0.121  0.130  0.146
1982  0.146  0.116  0.129  0.147
1983  0.161  0.129  0.147  0.180
1984  0.158  0.137  0.139  0.162
1985  0.158  0.144  0.136  0.175
1986  0.161  0.146  0.136  0.166
1987  0.155  0.136  0.133  0.204
B.  Intra-Industry  Variation in Wages3
Year  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39
1977  0.507  0.381  0.342  0.415  0.518  0.612  0.470  0.505  0.444
1978  0.496  0.422  0.436  0.443  0.541  0.422  0.419  0.426  0.347
1979  0.447  0.377  0.335  0.419  0.478  0.391  0.468  0.389  0.316
1980  0.436  0.342  0.306  0.383  0.454  0.366  0.355  0.374  0.341
1981  0.439  0.343  0.304  0.357  0.464  0.420  0.440  0.360  0.346
1982  0.442  0.350  0.328  0.358  0.448  0.370  0.435  0.369  0.325
1983  0.449  0.327  0.301  0.391  0.449  0.372  0.445  0.373  0.347
1984  0.389  0.329  0.253  0.399  0.448  0.386  0.463  0.349  0.288
1985  0.467  0.327  0.274  0.397  0.476  0.373  0.411  0.351  0.356
1986  0.446  0.339  0.279  0.391  0.457  0.400  0.393  0.346  0.343
1987  0.412  0.354  0.310  0.369  0.419  0.380  0.383  0.344  0.325
C.  Regional (County) Variation in Wages4
Year  Average Wage  Skilled Wage  Unskilled Wage  Apprentice  Wage
1981  0.279  0.170  0.268  0.263
1982  0.278  0.149  0.252  0.243
1983  0.296  0.346  0.293  0.236
1984  0.302  0.324  0.314  0.237
1985  0.293  0.340  0.279  0.215
1986  0.280  0.153  0.266  0.239
1987  0.281  0.354  0.250  0.259
1. Establishunent  survey data.
2.  Standard deviation of monthly wage across 3-digit ISIC industry.
3.  Standard deviation of monthly wage within 2-digit ISIC industry.
4.  Standard deviation of annual wage within detailed county.29
TABLE 6
The Effect of the Minimum  Wage on Average Earnings and Employment-Population  Ratios 1
Mexico and Colombia
MEXICO, 1972-90  COLOMBUA,  1962-90
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)
Dependent  In Wages  In Wages  In Emp/Pop  In Wages  In Wages  In Wages  In Emp/Pop
Variable:
In (Mnwage)2 .168  .170  -.182  .373  .441  .064  -.337
(.161)  (.169)  (.165)  (.161)  (.166)  (.141)  (.058)
In Real GNP  .089  .086  .137  -.123  -.138  .046  .252
(.064)  (.083)  (.057)  (.077)  (.179)  (.064)  (.046)
In GNP  Deflator  .783  .776  .372  .302  .287
(.133)  (.187)  (.273)  (.263)  (.191)
In Wages (-1)  .006  .611
(.097)  (.109)
Trend  -.032  -.032  .005  .060  .061  .008  -.028
(.017)  (.021)  (.005)  (.027)  (.025)  (.021)  (.005)
R2  .999  .999  .805  .999  .999  .999  .755
SE  .046  .044  .051  .054  .045  .034  .052
AR (1)  .322  .413
(.190)  (.183)
1. Manufacturing sector  employment  and wage series for both Mexico  and Colombia.
2.  In wage regressions  In(minimum  wage) is the In of the urban national minimum  wage  for Mexico  and the In of the
smaller cities minimum  wage  for Colombia. Ln(minimum  wage)  refers  to minimum  wages  deflated by average
manufacturing  wages  in the employment-population  regressions  in both countries.30
TABLE 7
Employment  Demand  Regressons'
Mexico  Panel Data, 1985-1990
(Firm  Fixed  Effects unless  otherwise  noted)
Unskilled  Employment  Skilled  Employment
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10)  (11)
Independent  OLS  OILS
Variables 2
In Min (-1)  -1.519  .016  .025  -.033  -.027  -1.080  .053  .008  -.011  -.007
(.135)  (.038)  (.069)  (.020)  (.020)  (.147)  (.043)  (.076)  (.022)  (.022)
In Min  .019  -.011  .058
(.021)  (.072)  (.080)
In Ws  .611  .060  .066  .060  .057  .057  .461  -.160  -.161  -.152  -.153
(.023)  (.007)  (.007)  (.007)  (.007)  (.007)  (.025)  (.007)  (.007)  (.007)  (.007)
In Wus  .370  -.131  -.131  -.130  -.120  -.128  .893  .056  .055  .051  .051
(.029)  (.008)  (.008)  (.008)  (.008)  (.008)  (.032)  (.009)  (.009)  (.009)  (.009)
ln Pm  -.111  -.029  -.034  -.028  -.032  -.015  -.248  .020  .018  .016  -.028
(.061)  (.019)  (.017)  (.019)  (.019)  (.019)  (.066)  (.021)  (.021)  (.021)  (.021)
In Pk  .779  .010  .002  .012  -.011  -.016  .069  -.014  -.024  -.018  -.021
(.111)  (.035)  (.025)  (.037)  (.043)  (.043)  (.121)  (.038)  (.041)  (.048)  (.048)
In PPI  .070  .048
(.018)  (.020)
In Output  .003  .002
(.001)  (.001)
Industiy  Y  N  N  N  N  N  Y  N  N  N  N
Occupation  Y  N  N  N  N  N  Y  N  N  N  N
Region  Y  N  N  N  N  N  Y  N  N  N  N
Year  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  y  y  y  Y
R2 .164  .024  .023  .024  .024  .024  .210  .035  .035  .034  .033
Dependent  variable equals In unskilled  employment  in columns 1-5 and In skilled employment  in columns 6-
10. All regressions  are based on 13,951  observations.
2 Factor price ratios (price divided  by ppi)  used in columns 1-3 and 6-8 regressions (In min, InWs,  InWus, In
Pm' and In Pk).  Columns  4-5 and 9-10  use factor price levels.TABLE 8
Employment Demand Regressionsl
Colombia Panel Data,  1981-1987
(Firm Fixed Effects unless otherwise noted)
Unskilled  Employment  Skilled Employment
Independent  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10)  (11)  (12)  (13)  (14)
Variables2 OLS  OLS
In Min (-1)  -2.287  -0.288  -0.288  -0.297  -2.927  -0.041  -0.244  -0.213
(.095)  (.039)  (.082)  (.082)  (.110)  (.047)  (.098)  (.098)
In Min  -0.149  -0.305  -0.333  -0.030  -0.208  -0.178
(.041)  (.098)  (.098)  (.049)  (.118)  (.117)
In W.  1.007  0.118  0.116  0.103  0.103  0.109  0.109  0.917  -0.155  -0.155  -0.143  -0.142  -0.142  -0.142
(.013)  (.006)  (.006)  (.006)  (.006)  (.006)  (.006)  (.015)  (.007)  (.007)  (.007)  (.007)  (.007)  (.007)
In WUS  0.331  -0.365  -0.368  -0.364  -0.364  -0.360  -0.360  0.888  0.037  0.037  0.042  0.042  0.042  0.042
(.016)  (.007)  (.007)  (.007)  (.007)  (.007)  (.007)  (.019)  (.009)  (.009)  (.008)  (.008)  (.008)  (.008)
In P.  -0.120  0.01  0.007  0.020  0.020  0.024  0.024  -0.046  0.022  0.021  0.008  0.008  0.008  0.008
(.012)  (.005)  (.005)  (.005)  (.005)  (.005)  (.005)  (.014)  (.006)  (.006)  (.006)  (.006)  (.006)  (.006)
In Pm  0.771  0.329  0.203  -0.032  -0.033  0.139  0.139  1.014  0.180  0.170  0.132  0.132  0.168  0.168
(.094)  (.043)  (.044)  (.021)  (.021)  (.012)  (.012)  (.109)  (.051)  (.053)  (.025)  (.025)  (.015)  (.015)
In PPI  0.177  0.177  0.037  0.036
(.017)  (.017)  (.021)  (.021)
In Output  0.003  0.003  0.004  0.004
(.001)  (.001)  (.001)  (.001)
Industry  Y  N  N  N  N  N  N  Y  N  N  N  N  N  N
City  Y  N  N  N  N  N  N  Y  N  N  N  N  N  N
Year  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y
R2  .274  .075  .074  .078  .078  .076  .076  .316  .020  .020  .021  .021  .021  .021
1 Dependent variable equals In unskilled employment in columns 1-7 and In skilled employment in columns 8-14. All regressions are based on 40,144
observations. In columns 1-5and 8-12 all independent variables weighted  by producer price index.
2 Factor price ratios (factor price divided by ppi) used in columns 1-3 and 8-10 regressions (In min, In W., In WUS,  In Pm, and In Pe).  Columns 4-7 and 11-14 use
factor prices levels for all independent variables except those measuring the minimum wage(ln min and In min(-I)).TABLE 8A
Robustness Tests of Employment Demand Regressions for Unskilled Only
Colombia Data
(Firm Fixed Effects)
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10)
Independent  1977-87  1977-87  1977-87  1977-87  1981-87  1981-87  1981-87  1981-87  1981-87  1981-87
Variablesl  No Alt.  No Alt.  No Alt.  No Alt.  No Alt.  No Alt.  No Skilled  No Skilled  Balanced  Balanced
Factor Price  Factor Price  Factor Price  Factor Price  Factor Price  Factor Price  Wage  Wage  Panel  Panel
In Min  -0.010  -0.023  0.022  -0.080  -0.445  -0.340  .259  -.554
(.009)  (.041)  (.020)  (.022)  (.042)  (.101)  (.064)  (.153)
In Min (-1)  -.017  -.127
(.010)  (.041)
In Ws  0.120  0.042  .120  .052  0.124  0.112  0.046  0.024  .107  .094
(.004)  (.003)  (.004)  (.003)  (.006)  (.005)  (.006)  (.006)  (.009)  (.009)
In Wus  -0.339  -0.292  -.347  -.303  -0.370  -0.365  -.470  -.465
(.005)  (.005)  (.006)  (.005)  (.007)  (.006)  (.012)  (.011)
In Pe  0.005  0.016  .031  .027
(.005)  (.005)  (.007)  (.007)  ,
In Pm  0.157  -0.234  -.065  -.143
(.045)  (.021)  (.067)  (.061)
In PPI  .262  .271  0.180  .077  .138
(.005)  (.006)  (.009)  (.018)  (.026)
Year  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y
R2  .076  .065  .081  .071  .078  .078  .015  .015  .100  .099
N  63,396  63,396  63,396  63,396  40,144  40,144  40,144  40,144  18,673  18,673
I Factor price ratios (factor price divided by ppi for In min, In W., In Wus, In Pm' and In Pe)) used in columns 1,3,5 and 7 implied  by homogeneity constraint.
Columns 2,4,6,and 8 use factor prices levels.33
TABLE  9
Evidence of Non-Compliance  with the Federal Minimum Wage in Mexico,  198812
(percent  of urban workers  earning  less  than the daily minimum  wage  of 7,218  Mexican  pesos)
A. Non-Compliance  by Occupation
Formal Sector  Informal Sector
Male  Female  Male  Female
Full-Time  Pa-Time  Ful-Thne  Pat-Time  Full-Time  Part-Thne  Full-The  Pa-Time
Professionals  0.3  2.8  0.2  4.7  3.8  16.8  11.8  34.8
Operators  0.7  3.6  1.3  2.6  8.3  33.7  26.8  76.7
Laborers  1.8  15.4  0.0  0.0  24.8  59.2  25.0  -
Officestaff  0.5  5.6  1.6  5.4  8.8  46.9  18.1  42.9
Salespersons  0.9  13.6  4.5  45.5  14.3  48.2  34.4  59.5
Service  work  2.7  14.3  2.0  25.0  24.2  58.7  66.0  76.2
B. Non-Compliance  by Region
Formal Sector  Informal Sector
Male  Female  Male  Female
Full-Time  Part-Time  Full-Time  Pat-Time  FuJI-Tie  Par-The  Full-Time  Part-Tine
Fed  District  0.3  2.2  1.1  4.9  8.2  46.5  40.3  67.6
North  0.6  2.1  0.7  13.7  9.6  35.6  35.1  49.2
South  3.0  0.0  4.7  40.0  29.0  75.0  43.6  61.3
C. Non-Compliance  by Education
Formal Sector  Informal Sector
Male  Female  Male  Female
F-Tim  Part-Tie  Fil-Time  Part-Thmu  Full-Tuee  Part-Time  FUll-The  Part-Time
No Education  0.7  0.0  6.3  50.0  26.5  57.6  62.2  82.9
L.T.  6 years  0.9  9.5  2.4  22.2  16.0  47.7  59.1  74.7
7-9  years  1.1  4.5  1.8  11.8  14.3  52.5  39.3  65.2
10-12  years  0.8  6.7  1.3  6.6  8.8  32.0  20.1  51.3
13-16  years  0.5  9.9  0.9  2.9  1.9  32.4  10.3  30.3
16+  years  0.2  1.4  1.3  0.0  2.0  9.4  3.4  26.2
I A worker  is classified  as formal  sector  if he or she  reports  receiving  social  security  and indicates  that they
work  in a registered  firm. All  other  workers  are classified  as informal  sector  workers. Based  on a sample  of
11,419  formal sector  workers  and 6,672  informal  sector  workers.
2 A worker  is classified  as full-time  if he or she reports  working  at least 35 hours a week  and indicates  that
they  normally  expect  to work  full-year.34
TABLE  10
Labor  Market  Segmentation  In Mexico,  1988
Private Sector Workers
Dependent  Variable:  In (hourly  income)
Male  Workers  Female  Workers
Full-Time  Onlyl  Part-Time Only  Full-Time Only  Part-Time Only
Independent  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8  (9)  (10)  (11)  (12)
Variables:
Formal  .107  .025  .038  .252  .101  .116  .523  .415  .154  .437  .255  .071
Sector 2 (.012)  (.011)  (.012)  (.054)  (.050)  (.057)  (.017)  (.017)  (.019)  (.061)  (.060)  (.066)
Experience  .040  .033  .062  .049  .035  .028  .040  .036
(.001)  (.001)  (.003)  (.003)  (.002)  (.002)  (.004)  (.004)
Experience 2 -.001  -.0005  -.001  -.001  -.0005  -.0004  -.0005  -.0005
(.000)  (.000)  (.000)  (.000)  (.000)  (.000)  (.000)  (.)
No Educ.  -.495  -.356  -.638  -.421  -.563  -.317  -.773  -.530
(.028)  (.030)  (.084)  (.080)  (.041)  (.037)  (.105)  (.102)
Some  Primary  -.344  -.261  -.434  -.269  -.481  -.289  -.559  -.397
Educ.  (.020)  (.018)  (.065)  (.063)  (.031)  (.028)  (.083)  (.089)
Primay Grad.  -.232  -.171  -.189  -.122  -.261  -.172  -.430  -.309
(.018)  (.016)  (.062)  (.059)  (.027)  (.024)  (.090)  (.087)
Some  Second.  -.086  -.070  -.097  -.073  -.061  -.066  -.156  -.114
(.021)  (.019)  (.073)  (.069)  (.032)  (.027)  (.099)  (.094)
SomeH.S.  .199  .141  .304  .243  .179  .130  .183  .251
(.019)  (.017)  (.067)  (.063)  (.028)  (.025)  (.093)  (.091)
College  .593  .417  .489  .347  .598  .378  .675  .687
(.025)  (.023)  (.082)  (.080)  (.047)  (.043)  (.122)  (.124)
More  than  .864  .659  .817  .583  .842  .690  .838  .784
College  (.025)  (.026)  (.091)  (.099)  (.056)  (.056)  (.138)  (.145)
Northern  .190  .263  .257  .375
Region  (.010)  (.035)  (.016)  (.046)
Southern  -.141  -.200  .117  -.142
Region  (.059)  (.164)  (.070)  (.143)
Federal  .052  .153  .187  .163
District  (.016)  (.055)  (.023)  (.057)
Occupation
dummies  N  N  Y  N  N  Y  N  N  Y  N  N  Y
Industry
dummies  N  N  Y  N  N  Y  N  N  Y  N  N  Y
R2 .009  .241  .393  .009  .213  .310  .138  .291  .483  .026  .147  .266
N  12990  12990  12990  2331  2331  2331  5620  5620  5620  1927  1927  1927
lFull-time  workers  are individuals  who report  working  greater  than 35 hours  per week  and year-ound.
2Equal to one if the individual  reports  woring in a job with  a registered  private  firm  and reports  receiving  social  security.35
TABLE.  11
Labor  Market  Segmentation  In Mexico,  19S8
(Private  Sector  Workers  Excluding  Self-Employed)l
Dependent Variable: In (hourly Income)
Male  Workers  Female Workers
Full-Time  Only 2 Part-Time Only  Full-Time  Only  Part-Time Only
Independent  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (S  (9)  (10)  (11)  (12)
Variables:
Formal  .315  .119  .184  .555  .244  .273  .663  .492  .237  .643  .400  .267
Sector 3 (.013)  (.012)  (.011)  (.053)  (.051)  (.050)  (.018)  (.018)  (.019)  (.058)  (.059)  (.065)
Experience  .038  .029  .062  .048  .034  .024  .034  .028
(.001)  (.001)  (.005)  (.005)  (.002)  (.002)  (.005)  (.005)
Experience 2 -.001  -.0005  -.001  -.001  -.001  -.0004  -.0004  -.0004
(.000)  (.000)  (.000)  (.000)  (.000)  (.000)  (.000)  (.000)
No Educ.  -.413  -.236  -.691  -.433  -.535  -.247  -.692  -.354
(.034)  (.029)  (.120)  (.113)  (.045)  (.037)  (.134)  (.124)
Some  Primary  -.286  -.187  -.507  -.323  -.434  -.221  -.557  -.287
Educ.  (.021)  (.018)  (.079)  (.075)  (.030)  (.026)  (.105)  (.099)
Primary  Grad.  -.206  -.130  -.246  -.155  -.240  -.139  -.317  -.126
(.018)  (.015)  (.076)  (.068)  (.026)  (.021)  (.100)  (.093)
Some  Second.  -.064  -.040  -.070  -.036  -.032  -.040  -.256  -. 157
(.022)  (.018)  (.080)  (.074)  (.031)  (.024)  (.109)  (.099)
Some  H.S.  .195  .127  .260  .214  .163  .095  .181  .195
(.019)  (.016)  (.076)  (.070)  (.026)  (.023)  (.099)  (.099)
College  .581  .390  .342  .219  .547  .311  .506  .497
(.026)  (.023)  (.091)  (.087)  (.046)  (.039)  (.131)  (.131)
More  than  .886  .651  .919  .645  .695  .559  .662  .573
College  (.028)  (.027)  (.143)  (.139)  (.061)  (.054)  (.174)  (.171)
Northern  .191  .248  .247  .255
Region  (.010)  (.044)  (.015)  (.056)
Southem  -.057  -.218  .026  .128
Region  (.064)  (.198)  (.075)  (.175)
Federal  .094  .212  .207  .168
District  (.016)  (.068)  (.021)  (.070)
Occupation
dummies  N  N  Y  N  N  Y  N  N  Y  N  N  Y
Industry
dummies  N  N  Y  N  N  Y  N  N  Y  N  N  Y
R2  .063  .280  .505  .085  .262  .391  .236  .359  .598  .112  .217  .382
N  8818  8818  8818  1171  1171  1171  4599  4599  4599  965  965  965
lExcludes  4,190  and 1,178  fuUl  and part-time  male  and 1,030 and 970 full and part-time  female  self-employed  workers.
2Full-time  workers  are individuals  who  report  working  greater  than 35  hours  per week  and year-round.
3Equal  to one if the individual  reports  working  in a job with a registered  private  firm  and reports  receiving  social  security.FIGURE 1
Wage Distributions  in Mexico
(Daily Wage in Pesos)
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Based on sample of 16,388  manufacturing  firms. Dailv minimum  wage equal to 666 pesos  (S3.46) and
9346 pesos (S3.17)  in 1984  and 1990  respectively.FIGURE 2
Wage Distributions in Mexico, by Industry and State
(Daily Wage in Pesos)
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1 3 Lowest  Paying  Industries by 2-digit ISIC code are: 31, 33, 39. Based  on a sample of 3,228
manufacturing  firms.  Daily minimum wage equal to 652  pesos ($3.42)  and 9346 pesos ($3.17)  in 1984
and 1990  respectively.
2  8 lowest  paying states are: Aguascalientes,  Campeche,  Durango,  Michoacan,  Oaxaca,  Quintana  Roo,
Yucatan,  and Zacatecas. Based on a sample of 819 manufacturing  firms. Daily minimum  wage  equal to
588  pesos ($3.05) and 9346 pesos ($3.17) in 1984  and 1990  respectively.FIGURE  3
Wage Distributions in Mexicol
Household Data for Full-Time Urban Workers, 1988
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'Distribution truncated  at upper tail due to sralSng
2Workers  at registered  private  firms receiving  IMSS. Based  on a sample  of 9,824 men and 4,752  women.
3Self-employed,  working  at unregistered  private fiums,  or not receiving  IMSS  at a registered firm. Based
on a sample  of 9,747 men and 3,824 women.FIGURE 4
Wagc Distribution in Mcxicol
Ilouselold  Data for Urban, Formal Sector Workers  by Occupation
(Daily Wage in Pesos)
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Wage  Distributions  in  Colombia
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Based  on data from 5630 and 6630 manufacturing  firms in 1977  for skilled  and unskilled  workers
respectively  and 6400 and 6839  manufacturing  firms in 1987  for skilled and unskilled  workers
respectively. Daily minixnmum  wage equal to 62.92 pesos  ($1.76) and 683.66 ($3.42) in 1977  and 1987
respectively.41
FIGURE  6
Minimum Wage  Behavior  in Colombia
URBUSTWK=Total  Unskilled  Employment  in LargeCities/Total  Unskilled Employment
UTRBMINUS=Minimum Wage  in Large  Cities/Average  Unskilled  Wage in Large  Cities
o urDustwk  B  urbminus
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